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ABSTRACT 
 
Multipath routing in WSN has been a long wish in security scenario where nodes on next-hop may be 
targeted to compromise. Many proposals of Multipath routing has been proposed in ADHOC Networks but 
under constrained from keying environment most seems ignorant. In WSN where crucial data is reported by 
nodes in deployment area to their securely located Sink, route security has to be guaranteed. Under 
dynamic load and selective attacks, availability of multiple secure paths is a boon and increases the 
attacker efforts by many folds. We propose to build a subset of neighbors as our front towards destination 
node. We also identified forwarders for query by base station. The front is optimally calculated to maintain 
the security credential and avail multiple paths. According to our knowledge ours is a novel secure 
multipath routing protocol for WSN. We established effectiveness of our proposal with mathematical 
analysis.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
WSN network evolved as monitoring tool in adverse, dynamically changing environment. 
Besides being used for security critical applications it surfaced into daily life monitoring systems 
ranging from mining applications to steel furnace reporting, from libraries to under-water 
monitoring, from moisture controlling to dam-reservoir controller, from toll-plaza to grocery-
stores. Applications are in abundance and so are the issues. With increasing demands for 
customized setups of WSNs new issues also surfaced. It needs custom solutions to demanding 
situations. Many works has addressed the specific issues in WSN. We specifically limit ourselves 
to problem of maintaining multiple routes not necessarily node-disjoint through networks which 
are equally secure and have qualified under a complex qualifying criterion in threat prone 
deployment areas. Besides improving upon best-effort delivery we tried to maintain high value of 
protection keys in the links. We are working on the principle that route is as strong as the weakest 
link in the route. We have proposed a probabilistic model for selecting our front towards a 
specific destination. Proposal has been generic and we specialized it to achieve security 
requirements in the threat prone deployments. Probabilistic model can be specialized for other 
requirements like distance, energy, throughput and delay. Section 2 discusses related work in the 
area with section 3 and 4presenting network and probabilistic analytical model of proposal and 
routing scheme. Section 5 we present performance analysis. With Section 6 we finally conclude 
and cite future directions. 
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2. RELATED WORKS 
 
Several works in security and key management in WSN have been reported and most addressed 
the security of single path from sender to destination. Proposals in [2] and [3] addressed the the 
provisioning of security in WSN using Single Network-Wide Key. Compromising one key will 
compromise the security of whole network. In [3] an approach for establishing Pair-wise between 
every pair of nodes was proposed but the initialization of scheme is based on master key. Master 
key is erased after initialization and thus not scalable. A proposal in [55] proposed Trusted Base 
Station based key management scheme SPINS using SNEP and μTESLA as building blocks. 
SNEP offers data confidentiality, authentication, integrity, and freshness, while μTESLA offers 
broadcast data authentication. SPINS uses less of a sensor node’s memory and the 
communication costs for SPINS are small, with security properties like data freshness, 
authentication and confidentiality. Several proposals [4] [5] [6] [8] addressed the security using 
key pre-distribution schemes. Most of these schemes allow the probabilistic approach to decide 
the security credential. In [7] and [9] authors proposed a scheme using deployment knowledge. A 
scheme in [10] was proposed for using location dependence in clustered hierarchical sensor 
networks. We have proposed few key management schemes in [11] [12] [13] [14] and [15]. 
Scheme in [11] guarantee connectivity using location effect in pre distributed keying 
environment. In [12] we proposed a scheme implementing framework for key management 
schemes in heterogeneous wireless sensor networks. In [13] we proposed a key management 
which is most computation efficient and storage efficient. In [14] we proposed a key management 
scheme which build secure route from source to destination using variance of keys on links on 
route while selecting next link on route being built. In [15] we implemented a key management 
scheme which exploits location information. None of the scheme cited above offers multiple and 
equally secure paths between source and destination.  
 
3. OUR PROPOSAL  
 
In this section we present our proposal with network elements and network model. We could 
address the query and data routing in our proposal using Query Relays (QR) and  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Wireless Environment Scenario 
 
Data Relays DR). QR relays the query from sink to a deployment area or single node. DR route 
reply back to sink using data relays. The routes for query and reply may have same or disjoint 
routes and ensures minimum delay. 
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3.1 Preliminary 
 
We consider a list of forward nodes as proposed in [1] for selecting nodes out of one hop 
neighbours towards a particular destination. This is as shown in figure.1. Single destination in 
WSN happens to be Base Station. Nodes are homogeneous in nature and have fixed transmission 
range. Diagram in figure represents an example scenario. Each link in figure1 cost some energy to 
sender and receiver. With error prone environment each link suffers some error. Node ݑ has 
selected nodes {ݒଵ, ݒଶ, … , ݒ௡} as possible set of forwarding nodes. This is treated as priority list 
and node ݒଵconsidered to most preferred node. Opportunistically nodes forward message sent by 
ݑ towards BS. There is possibility of multiple copies of message being forwarded by forwarder 
nodes because of hidden node problems. Opportunistic routing may suffer from duplicated 
packets as there is no solution for schedule for nodes forwarding packets via forwarder nodes and 
security is not considered and thus prone threats.  
 
3.2 Network Model and Elements 
 
We consider a wireless Sensor Network consisting of Large Number of L-Sensors and a few 
number of H-Sensors. Initially, we assume 15% of total nodes consist of H-Sensors. Nodes are 
given unique IDs and are assigned by Sink. Each Sensor has fixed transmission range. We may 
assume that H-Sensor has comparatively larger transmission range and more storage capacity to 
entail larger number of keys. The resultant network is modeled as multi-hop network and fits the 
definition of graph. An edge between a pair ܵܰݏ implies connectivity between concerned nodes.  
  
Consider a WSN with nodes having unique identities (IDs).  We assume that every wireless node 
ݑ has fixed transmission power. Assume ܹܵܰ = {ܣ,ܪ, ܮ,ܭ, ݇ଵ, ݇ଶ,ܧ,ܸ} where ܣ denotes 
deployment area dimensions, ܪ denotes number of H-Sensors, ܮ describes the strength of L-
Sensors, ܭ is the key pool, ݇ଵdenotes number of keys given to L-Sensors, ݇ଶdenotes number of 
keys pre-distributed to H-Sensors. ܧ	Denote the undirected/undirected edge set and ܸ	denotes 
nodes set respectively. Each directed link ݑ ⟶ ݒ has a nonnegative weight, denoted by ݇(ݑ,ݒ) 
which is the number of shared randomly pre-distributed keys and to be used by node ݑ together to 
send a packet to node ݒ	for encryption during forwarding. In addition, each link has a failure 
probability, denoted by	݂(ݑ, ݒ), which is the probability that a transmission over link (ݑ,ݒ) is 
not successful because of unavailability or schedule, i.e., to have a chance of 1 − ݂(ݑ, ݒ) for 
successful secure transmission a packet to node		ݒ; node ݒ must be active or not simultaneously 
receiving other transmission. No transmission is possible if node’s shares no key. To illustrate the 
idea let us consider a network example in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Example Scenario 
ݑ 
ݒ3 
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The unavailability probability from the source node to each node ݒ௜ is	݂ and is same for all links. 
In our proposal instead of relaying through one node, say	ݒ௜; we propose to use a set of nodes 
forming a forwarding relays which is a priority list for routing packets towards a fixed destination 
i.e. base station. We call such nodes forward relays (݂ܴ). We can compute that the expected 
number of transmissions will be 	 ଵ
ଵି௙
	for the intended node ݒ௜ to receive the packet correctly.  
 
 Let node ݒ௜ is selected as member of ݂ܴ	by	ݒ௝, ݒ௞and ݒ௟ nodes, such set of nodes i.e. 
൛ݒ௝,ݒ௞ ,ݒ௟ൟ is Selectors Set and we will use them as query relays and named as backward relays( 
ܾܴݏ) on reverse path from sink to node(s). 
 
 On the other hand, by having multiple ݂ܴ to counter for unavailability or outage and 
considering multiple one-hop nodes in the role of	݂ܴ, in symmetric-paired-key environment, the 
expected numbers of transmissions for at least one node to receive the packet by ݂ܴݏ increase 
to	 ଵ(ଵି௙)೙. The denominator term is raised to power	݊, because of paired keying environment in 
random key pre-distribution which contrasts from broadcast environment. Assume that ݂ܴ	are 
maintained as priority list. The ݂ܴ list is prioritized to indicate which nodes have higher priority 
to forward the packet. The node in ݂ܴ list, which received the packet successfully, will act as 
new source nodes and route the packet to the target node via its	݂ܴ. Finally; main idea of our 
secure forwarding which we named as Expected Secure Relaying (ESR) is as follows: we 
let		ܧܣܭ௨൫݂ܴ(ݑ)൯	denote the Effective Average Key harnessed on the route from node 
ݑ	to	ܵ݅݊݇, where ݂ܴ(ݑ) is chosen by ݑ as	݂ܴ. During initial step ܧܣܭௌ௜௡௞ 	 is initialized to 0 
along with all other nodes. The updates on	ܧܣܭ௨, ݂ܴ(ݑ) and ܾܴ(ݑ) are computed periodically.  
  
3.3 Setting up Forward Relay Key (	ࢌࡾ࢑ࢋ࢟	) 
 
 Equation ଵ(ଵି௙)೙ specifies the number of retransmissions to be performed for at least one in ݂ܴݏ 
receive and forward the packet from its selector. If we can increase the denominator to (1 − ݂௡) 
by providing a broadcast environment with nodes in		݂ܴ	we can reduce number of broadcast for 
at least one node in ݂ܴ receive successfully. In case of encryption using all pair-wise keys 
obtained it is difficult to have broadcast environment. We strive to establish a secure broadcast 
key between node and its ݂ܴ using following method. Let we identify nodes ݅, ݆	as nodes in ݂ܴ 
of node	ݏ. Figure 3 and 4 shows the steps for establishing forward key. Consider node ݏ being 
selector sends encrypted messages to members ݅	&	݆ in steps 1 to 6 are performed in sequence as 
shown in figure above. 
  
Messages in step 1 and 2 are encrypted using all pre-distributed shared keys between ݅ − ݏ	and 
݆ − ݏ	pairs. On verifying the integrity of messages; ݅	&	݆ compute their shares individually and 
sends messages to ݏ encrypted using all pre-distributed shared keys between	݅ − ݏ and ݆ − 	ݏ in 
steps 3 and 4 respectively. Having received all shares from  ݂ܴ(ݏ) selector node ݏ generates its 
unique share and using X-OR of all shares with its own share generates a unique ݂ܴ௞௘௬ for 
communication with ܦܴݏ only. In step 5 and 6 selector node		ݏ dispatches ݂ܴ௞௘௬  key message 
destined for	݅	&	݆. Now	݅	&݆ can generate ݂ܴ௞௘௬  key using the contents from ݂ܴ	ܭ݁ݕ message 
and own share there by verify the identity of sender and integrity of message. Following equation 
(1) gives an insight of operation: 
 
݂ܴ௞௘௬ = 	 ܵܪ௦⨁ܵܪ௜⨁ܵܪ௝																									(1) 
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Figure 3. Forward Key Establishment from Shares 
 
 
Step 1: ܫܦ௜||ܯܾ݁݉݁ݎ	݉݁ݏݏܽ݃݁{ܯܣܥ(ܯ)||ܯ}௄೔ೞ  
Step 2: ܫܦ௝||ܯܾ݁݉݁ݎ	݉݁ݏݏܽ݃݁{ܯܣܥ(ܯ)||ܯ}௄ೕೞ 
Step 3: ܫܦ௦||ܯݕ	ܵℎܽݎ݁{ܯܣܥ(ܵܪ௜)||ܵܪ௜}௄೔ೞ 
Step 4: ܫܦ௦||ܯݕ	ܵℎܽݎ݁൛ܯܣܥ൫ܵܪ௝൯||ܵܪ௝ൟ௄ೕೞ  
Step 5: ܫܦ௜||	ܨܴ൛ܯܣܥ൫ܵܪ௜⨁ܵܪ௝⨁ܵܪ௦൯||ܵܪ௝⨁ܵܪ௦ൟ௄೔ೞ 
Step 6: ܫܦ௝||ܨܴ൛ܯܣܥ൫ܵܪ௜⨁ܵܪ௝⨁ܵܪ௦൯||ܵܪ௜⨁ܵܪ௦ൟ௄ೕೞ 
Step 7:	݂ܴ௞௘௬ = 	 ܵܪ௦⨁ܵܪ௜⨁ܵܪ௝  
 
 
Figure 4. Steps for Establishing Forward Key 
 
Thus ݂ܴ௞௘௬ key is established using shares from contributors. As the numbers of forwarders are 
one or more so are the contributions. To compromise the ݂ܴ௞௘௬every path between selector and 
it’s	݂ܴݏ	has to be compromised. As ݂ܴ௞௘௬ is common among selectors and ݂ܴݏ; we now are 
able to exploit the broadcast advantage in wireless medium and reduce the number of trials for at 
least one of forwarders receive and forward the packet. Increasing the denominator in equation 
from (1 − ݂)௡to 1 − ݂௡will decrease the number of trials for successful receiving and 
forwarding of message.   
 
 
1 
۷۲ܑ||ۻ܍ܕ܊܍ܚ	ܕ܍ܛܛ܉܏܍{ۻۯ۱(ۻ)||ۻ}۹ܑܛ 
۷۲ܒ||ۻ܍ܕ܊܍ܚ	ܕ܍ܛܛ܉܏܍{ۻۯ۱(ۻ)||ۻ}۹ܒܛ 
2 
۷۲ܛ||ۻܡ	܁ܐ܉ܚ܍{ۻۯ۱(܁۶ܑ)||܁۶ܑ}۹ܑܛ 
3 ۷۲ܛ||ۻܡ	܁ܐ܉ܚ܍൛ۻۯ۱൫܁۶ܒ൯||܁۶ܒൟ۹ܒܛ 
4 ۷۲ܑ||۴܀൛ۻۯ۱൫܁۶ܑ⨁܁۶ܒ⨁܁۶ܛ൯||܁۶ܒ⨁܁۶ܛൟ۹ܑܛ 
۷۲ܒ||۴܀൛ۻۯ۱൫܁۶ܑ⨁܁۶ܒ⨁܁۶ܛ൯||܁۶ܑ⨁܁۶ܛൟ۹ܒܛ 5 
6 
࢏ ࢙ ࢐ 
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3.4 Setting up Backward Relay Key	࢈ࡾ࢑ࢋ࢟ 
 
Consider that a particular node has obtained distinct ݂ܴ௞௘௬  for use with distinct selector. 
Assume that a node ݅ was in	݂ܴݏ of set ܵ where	ܵ = {ݏଵ, ݏଶ, ݏଷ}. We identify set {ݏଵ , ݏଶ, ݏଷ} as possible backward Relay (ܾܴ) set of node	݅. Let ܾܴ(݅) denotes ܾܴ set of 
node ݅ and	ܾܴ(݅) = 	 {ݏଵ, ݏଶ, ݏଷ}. Assuming	݂ܴ௞௘௬௦భ,௜  , ݂ܴ௞௘௬௦మ,௜ and ݂ܴ௞௘௬௦య,௜  denotes 
݂ܴ௞௘௬between	ݏଵ − ݅, ݏଶ − ݅ and	ݏଷ − ݅ , node ݅ can now compute ܾܴ௞௘௬ for use as query 
broadcast key by node	݅	. Following steps outline the generation and distribution 
of	ܾܴ௞௘௬. 
  
Step 1: ܫܦ௜||	ܾܴ	ܵ݁ݐܷ݌{ܯܣܥ(ܳ)||ܳ}௙ோೖ೐೤ೞభ ,೔    
Step 2: ܫܦ௜||	ܾܴ	ܵ݁ݐܷ݌{ܯܣܥ(ܳ)||ܳ}௙ோೖ೐೤ೞమ ,೔  
Step 3: ܫܦ௜||	ܾܴ	ܵ݁ݐܷ݌{ܯܣܥ(ܳ)||ܳ}௙ோೖ೐೤ೞయ ,೔  
Step 4: ܫܦ௜||	ܵℎܽݎ݁ݏ൛ܯܣܥ൫݂ܴ௞௘௬௦మ,௜⨁݂ܴ௞௘௬௦య,௜ ൯||݂ܴ௞௘௬௦మ,௜⨁݂ܴ௞௘௬௦య,௜ ൟ௙ோೖ೐೤ೞభ,೔  
Step 5: ܫܦ௜||	ܵℎܽݎ݁ݏ൛ܯܣܥ൫݂ܴ௞௘௬௦భ,௜⨁݂ܴ௞௘௬௦య,௜ ൯||݂ܴ௞௘௬௦భ,௜⨁݂ܴ௞௘௬௦య,௜ ൟ௙ோೖ೐೤ೞమ,೔  
Step 6: ܫܦ௜||	ܵℎܽݎ݁ݏ൛ܯܣܥ൫݂ܴ௞௘௬௦భ,௜⨁݂ܴ௞௘௬௦మ,௜ ൯||݂ܴ௞௘௬௦భ,௜⨁݂ܴ௞௘௬௦మ,௜ ൟ௙ோೖ೐೤ೞయ,೔  
Step 7: ܾܴ௞௘௬
௕ோ(௜),௜ = ൫݂ܴ௞௘௬௦భ,௜⨁݂ܴ௞௘௬௦మ,௜⨁݂ܴ௞௘௬௦య,௜ ൯ 
 
 
Figure 5. Steps for Establishing Backward Key 
 
Figure 5 shows the steps for establishing backward key. Step 1 to step 3 is encrypted 
communication from node ݅ to each of it’s ܾܴ(݅) for ܾܴ௞௘௬ key setup. Step 4 to step 6 results 
into dispatch of partial key to selectors. Step 7 finally establishes ܾܴ௞௘௬ at node ݅ and 
selectors	{ݏଵ, ݏଶ, ݏଷ}.  
 
3.5 Expected Key Average 
 
Now, we present the main idea of calculating the Effective Key Average (ܧܭܣ) for each node 
and selecting the forward Relays	(݂ܴ). We define ܧܭܣ as the average keys used to provide a 
broadcast environment in pre-distributed keying environment. As in above section ݂ܴ௞௘௬ has 
been established using all shared pre-distributed keys on links between selectors and ݂ܴ nodes, 
which implies that effectiveness of routing in our customized broadcast environment using 
݂ܴ௞௘௬is as effective as is the average number of keys used in setting up of ݂ܴ௞௘௬.  
 
 Consider a node ݑ and its one-hop neighbors. We will compute the,	ܧܭܣ	and 
ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ(ݑ)	of node ݑ based on the ܧܭܣ of its neighbors whose ܧܭܣ of sending data to the 
ܵ݅݊݇ has already been computed. We want to choose a subset of neighboring nodes ܰ(ݑ) as 
ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ(ݑ)of node ݑ such that the ܧܭܣ	on the route from node ݑ to send a packet to ܵ݅݊݇ is 
maximized. 
 
International Journal in Foundations of Computer Science & Technology (IJFCST), Vol.4, No.4, July 2014 
 
55 
 Consider ܵ݅݊݇ as our destination node. Given a set of nodes	ܷ, let ܷ# defines the sorted 
list of ܷ based on 	ܧܭܣ to send data (via possible relay) to	ܵ݅݊݇. 
 
  If ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ(ݑ) denote the priority next hop list of node	ݑ then	ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#(ݑ)	represents 
sorted next hop list on ܧܭܣ in decreasing order. i.e, ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#(ݑ) = ൛ݒଵ,ݒଶ, … ,ݒ|ேு௅௜௦௧(௨)|ൟ	 
where	݅ < ݆ ⟹ ܧܭܣ௩೔ ≤ ܧܭܣ௩ೕ .Using the theory of probability let ܨ denotes the probability 
of total failure i.e. a packet sent by node ݑ is not received by any node in	ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#(ݑ). Clearly, 
 
	ܨ = ∏ ௨݂௩೔|ேு௅௜௦௧#(௨)|௜ୀଵ   (2) 
 
   The probability of at least one node in		ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#(ݑ) will receive packets successfully, 
can be computed as	ܴ = 1 − ܨ. We can compute the number of trials that node ݑ must perform 
in order to achieve first success by		1 ܴ	ൗ . For e.g. if probability of success is 0.5 then number of 
trial to have first success can be given by	1 0.5 = 2⁄ .  If  	1 ܴ	ൗ gives the number of trials that a 
node must perform to send a packet which is received by at least one in the ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#(ݑ) then 
using trials information for nodes ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#(ݑ) we can compute possible delay incurred to get 
the packet at ܵ݅݊݇.  
 
 Let,	ܧܭܣ௨
௩೔(ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#) denote the expected key average on next hop from ݑ through one 
of the node ݒ௜in ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ# then ܧܭܣ௨௩೔  that will be used can be computed as: 
 
ܧܭܣ௨
௩೔ቀݒ௜ ∈ ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#(ݑ)ቁ= ݇௨௩భ ∗ ൫݌௨௩భ൯ + ݇௨௩మ ∗ ൫݌௨௩మ൯ + ⋯+ ݇௨௩|ಿಹಽ೔ೞ೟#(ೠ)| ∗ ቀ݌௨௩|ಿಹಽ೔ೞ೟#(ೠ)|ቁ1 − ݂ |ேு௅௜௦௧#(௨)| 							(3) 
 
 Where ݌௨௩೔represent the probability of forwarding to ݒ௜ inܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ
#(ݑ). As one of the 
forwarder has to forward ultimately (may require many trials) requires that	∑ 	݌௨௩೔
|ேு௅௜௦௧#(௨)|
௜ୀଵ =1.  For e.g. If	|ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#(ݑ)| = 3	then	ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#(ݑ) = {ݒଵ,ݒଶ,ݒଷ}	. If forwarder ݒଵhas been 
assigned highest priority of among three forwarders with ݒଶassigned second then we have 4ܺ + 2ܺ + 1ܺ = 1 where	݌௨௩೔ = 2 ∗ (݅ − 1) ∗ ܺ . This implies	݌௨௩భ = 4 ∗ ܺ,	݌௨௩మ = 2 ∗ ܺ 
, ݌௨௩య = 1 ∗ ܺ. This leads to	݌௨௩భ = 0.57,	݌௨௩మ = .29, 	݌௨௩య = .14. If ݂(ݑ, ݒ௜) = 	 .5 
If we assume that	݇௨௩భ = 30,	݇௨௩మ = 27, 	݇௨௩య = 22 then	ܥ௨௩೔(ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ∗) = 54.  
 
 When at least one node in the forwarder list of node ݑ received the packet successfully, 
we need to calculate the expected cost to forward the packet sent by node	ݑ. Let 
ܧܭܣ௨ௌ௜௡௞ 	ቀܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#(ݑ)ቁ denotes	ܧܭܣfor ݑ	to forward (using some nodes in the forwarder list 
of	ݑ) the packet to the ܵ݅݊݇.If ܧܭܣ௨ௌ௜௡௞ቀܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#(ݑ)ቁ represent Effective Average Keys of 
route through ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#(ݑ) can be calculated as follows: assume the relays list isܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ# =
൛ݒଵ,ݒଶ, … ,ݒ|ேு௅௜௦௧(௨)|ൟ	. The probability that node ݒଵ forwards the packet is 1 − ݂(ݑ,ݒଵ)	and 
Effective Keys Average of ݒଵis	ܧܣܭ௩భ
ௌ௜௡௞; then node ݒଶ will forward the packet with probability 
݂(ݑ,ݒଵ) ∗ (1− ݂(ݑ, ݒଶ) and the Effective Keys Average will be	ܧܣܭ௩మௌ௜௡௞ . Basically, node ݒ௜ 
forwards the packet if it receives the packet and nodes	ݒ௝; 0 < ݆ < ݅ did not receive the packet, 
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and in this case, the Effective Average Keys will be	ܧܣܭ௩೔
ௌ௜௡௞ . Hence, ܧܭܣ௩೔
ௌ௜௡௞ 	 can be 
computed as follows:   
 
ܧܣܭ௨ௌ௜௡௞ቀݒ௜ ∈ ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#(ݑ)ቁ= ൫1 − ௨݂௩భ൯ ∗ ܧܣܭ௩భௌ௜௡௞+ ෍ ቌෑ ௨݂௩ೕ௜ିଵ
௝ୀଵ
ቍ ∗ ൫1 − ௨݂௩೔൯ ∗ ܧܣܭ௩೔ௌ௜௡௞ 	(4)|ேு௅௜௦௧#|
௜ୀଶ
 
 
 Finally; ܧܣܭ௨(ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#) the on route from ݑ	to ܵ݅݊݇ is computed as follows:  
ܧܣܭ௨ቀܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ
#(ݑ)ቁ = ܧܣܭ௩೔ௌ௜௡௞ቀݒ௜ ∈ ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#(ݑ)ቁ1 − ݂ |ேு௅௜௦௧#(௨)| 						(4.1) 
 
ܧܣܭ௨
ௌ௜௡௞ = ܧܣܭ௨௩೔ቀݒ௜ ∈ ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#(ݑ)ቁ + ܧܣܭ௨ቀܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#(ݑ)ቁ								(4.2) 
 
Equation (4) illustrated how to compute	ܧܣܭ	of a sender to broadcast a packet if the current 
chosen forwarder list is	ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#(ݑ). Equation (4.1) computes tentative ܧܣܭ which finalizes 
ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#(ݑ) and equation (4.2) computes real ܧܣܭ by augmenting tentative ܧܣܭ  with last-
hop cost computed in equation (3).  Thus first part i.e. equation (4.1) is ܧܣܭ for the sender to 
successfully transmit a packet to at least one receiver in	ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#. The second part i.e. (4.2) 
corresponds to ܧܣܭ that one of node in the ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ# finally to relays the packet to the final 
destination node.  
 
3.6 Finding the ࡺࡴࡸ࢏࢙࢚ 
 
Instead of random selection of nodes from	ܰ(ݑ), we choose a prefix of sorted neighbor list 
ܰ#(ݑ) as our result i.e. ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#(ݑ) . For a given ܰ#(ݑ) there can be at the most |ܰ#(ݑ)| +1 prefixes. Selecting nodes from	ܰ#(ݑ) , one at each step provided	ܧܣܭ௩೔ > ܧܣܭ௨ . If ݒ௜ fails 
to satisfy the required condition; every node ahead of ݒ௜	in ܰ#(ݑ)fails to satisfy the said 
condition.   
 
4. ROUTING ALGORITHM 
 
How nodes will select their forwarder list and how to use expected cost is highlighted in previous 
section. Now we are able standardize the steps as collection of three algorithms, namely; 
ܷ݌݀ܽݐ݁_ܧܣܭ, ܥ݋݉݌ݑݐ݁_ܧܣܭ_ݐ݋_ܵ݅݊݇,	ܦ݅ݏ݌ܽݐܿℎ_ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ. These algorithms are presumed to 
be hardcoded and can be executed as per their requirements. After execution of 
ܥ݋݉݌ݑݐ݁_ܥ݋ݏݐ_ݐ݋_ܵ݅݊݇	sink has information of about selectors and Relays. Each selector may 
have multiple relays and each node may possess multiple selectors. In each case we have a subset 
of one-hop neighbors as selector or relays or selectors-relays combined. Using the information 
received from nodes in deployment area sink is able to compute routes from sink to nodes. Sink 
may use these routes to periodically diffuse query in the network, whereas nodes may use their 
forwarders towards sink to report any urgent event.  The algorithm’s pseudo code is described in 
figure 6. 
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4.2 Exchanging (ࡺࡴࡸ࢏࢙࢚ ) List Information 
 
Each node prioritized their relays in	ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ. Selection along with priority is informed to relays 
by selectors. This process may be initiated by nodes after completing the execution of  
 
ܥ݋݉݌ݑݐ݁_ܧܣܭ_ݐ݋_ܵ݅݊݇ ቀܵ݅݊݇,ܸ,ܧܣܭ௨൫ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#(ݑ)൯ቁ  
ܤܧܩܫܰ	{ܥ݋݉݌ݑݐ݁_ܧܣܭ_ݐ݋_ܵ݅݊݇} 
ܵ݅݊݇_ܤݎ݋ܽ݀ܿܽݏݐ_ܫ݊݅ݐ݈݅ܽ݅ݖ݁ 
ܰ݋݀݁_ܫ݊݅ݐ݈݅ܽ݅ݖ݁:ܧܣܭ௨൫ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#(ݑ)൯ = 0	,ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#(ݑ) = 	߶ 
ܰ݋݀݁_ܤݎ݋ܽ݀ܿܽݏݐ_ܫܦܵ + ܧܣܭ 
ܰ݋݀݁	ܵ݋ݎݐ	ܰ݁݅݃ℎܾ݋ݑݎ	ܮ݅ݏݐ	݋݊	ܧܣܭ in decreasing order to get ܰ# 
ܰ݋݀݁ݏ	ܧݔ݁ܿݑݐ݁ݏ:	ܧܣܭ௨൫ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#(ݑ)൯ = ܷ݌݀ܽݐ݁_ܧܣܭቀܧܣܭ௨൫ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#(ݑ)൯,ܰ(ݑ)ቁ  
ݑ ∈ ܸ, ܧܣܭ௨൫ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#(ݑ)൯ = 0	, ܧܣܭௌ௜௡௞ௌ௜௡௞൫ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#(ܵ݅݊݇)൯ 	= 	0 
ܵ݅݊݇_ܮ݅݉݅ݐ݁݀_ܤݎ݋ܽ݀ܿܽݏݐ൛ܧܣܭௌ௜௡௞ௌ௜௡௞ൟ 
∀ݑ ∈ ܰ(ܵ݅݊݇)ܧݔ݁ܿݑݐ݁ݏ:		ܧܣܭ௨ௌ௜௡௞൫ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#(ݑ)൯ = ܷ݌݀ܽݐ݁_ܧܣܭ ቀܧܣܭ௨ௌ௜௡௞൫ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#(ݑ)൯,ܰ(ݑ)ቁ 
ݎ݁݌݁ܽݐ 
									݈݁ݐ	 ଵܵ = ܸ − {ܵ݅݊݇}	ܽ݊݀	ܵଶ = {ܵ݅݊݇} 
									ݎ݁݌݁ܽݐ 
																	ݒ = ݉݅݊_ܿ݋ݏݐ{ ଵܵ} 
																	 ଵܵ = ଵܵ ∪ {ݒ}	ܽ݊݀	ܵଶ = ଶܵ − {ݒ}	  
 																∀ݑ ∈ ܰ(ݒ) ∩ ଵܵ ∶ ܧܣܭ்ாெ௉ = ܧܣܭ௨ௌ௜௡௞൫ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#(ݑ)൯ 
																	∀ݑ ∈ ܰ(ݒ) ∩ ଵܵ ∶ ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#(ݑ)்ாெ௉ = ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#(ݑ) 
																	∀ݑ ∈ ܰ(ݒ) ∩ ଵܵ	ܧݔ݁ܿݑݐ݁ݏ:ܧܣܭ௨൫ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#(ݑ)൯= 																																																																ܷ݌݀ܽݐ݁_ܧܣܭ ቀܧܣܭ௨൫ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#(ݑ)൯,ܰ(ݑ)ቁ	 
									ݑ݊ݐ݈݅			 ଵܵ = 	∅ 
									∀ݑ ∈ ܸ,ܰ݋݀݁_ܤݎ݋ܽ݀ܿܽݏݐ_ݐ݋_ܰ(ݑ):ܧܣܭ௨ௌ௜௡௞൫ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#(ݑ)൯ 
									∀ݑ ∈ ܸ	ܧݔ݁ܿݑݐ݁ݏ:ܧܣܭ௨൫ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#(ݑ)൯= 																																																																ܷ݌݀ܽݐ݁_ܧܣܭ ቀܧܣܭ௨൫ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#(ݑ)൯,ܰ(ݑ)ቁ		 
ݑ݊ݐ݈݅			ܰ݋	ܥℎܽ݊݃݁	݅݊	ܧܣܭ		ܽ݊݀	ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ# 
ܦ݅ݏ݌ܽݐܿℎ_ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#; 
ܧ݊݀	{ܥ݋݉݌ݑݐ݁_ܧܣܭ_ݐ݋_ܵ݅݊݇} 
 
 
ܷ݌݀ܽݐ݁_ܧܣܭቀܧܣܭ௨൫ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#(ݑ)൯,ܰ(ݑ)ቁ  
ܤܧܩܫܰ	{ܷ݌݀ܽݐ݁_ܧܣܭ} 
Sort the neighboring nodes ܰ(ݑ) = ൛ݒଵ, ݒଶ, … , ݒ|ே(௨)|ൟ based on their EAK in decreasing order 
and get	ܰ#(ݑ). 
݂݋ݎ(݅ = 1; ݅ < |ܰ#(ݑ)|; ݅ + +)  
 ݂݅ ቀܧܣܭ௨൫ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#(ݑ)൯ < ܧܣܭ௩೔ௌ௜௡௞൫ݒ௜ ∉ ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#(ݑ)൯ቁ ݐℎ݁݊ 
 ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#(ݑ) = ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#(ݑ) ∪ {ݒ௜}	and update ݌௨௩೔ 
Update ܧܣܭ௨൫ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#(ݑ)൯ using equation(5) in steps (5.1) and (5.2) 
ݎ݁ݐݑݎ݊ ቀܧܣܭ௨൫ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#(ݑ)൯ቁ 
ܧ݊݀	{ܷ݌݀ܽݐ݁_ܧܣܭ} 
 
 
ܦ݅ݏ݌ܽݐܿℎ_ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#()  
ܤܧܩܫܰ	{ܦ݅ݏ݌ܽݐܿℎ_ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#} 
ݑ ∈ ܸ	,ݑ	 ⇛ ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#(ݑ)	 
ܧ݊݀{ܦ݅ݏ݌ܽݐܿℎ_ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#} 
 
Figure 6 Routing Scheme 
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ܥ݋݉݌ݑݐ݁_ܧܣܭ_ݐ݋_ܵ݅݊݇. Relays node in ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ are like vectors disclosing direction towards 
sink. Reverse channel is always available. Now relays have information of their relays and 
selectors.  This information is propagated to sink using unicast messages through relays 
in	ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ. Aggregating the information by relays nodes help reduce the number of messages. 
Selectors are proposed to be used for routing any query towards a region or node and path 
through relays to route a reply to destination sink respectively. We have classified the Selector 
nodes as Query Forwarder and Relay Nodes as Data Forwarders.  
 
4.3 Route Construction 
 
Sink has information of node wise selectors and relays. For query forwarding sink constructs 
query route using pairs like: 
 (ܦ, {ܨݓ݀(ܦ)}),  ({ܨݓ݀(ܦ)}, {ܨݓ݀({ܨݓ݀(ܦ)})}	)  
…  
൫ܨݓ݀൫൛… {ܨݓ݀({ܨݓ݀(ܦ)})}ൟ൯	, ܵ݅݊݇൯.  
 
Each such pair gives a possible hop on the respective paths. As a result sink may obtain all 
possible paths towards a specific node i.e. D or vice-versa. ܵ݅݊݇	may choose any of such paths for 
propagation of query. Sink may choose any of the route on the basis of optimization criterion 
which may be delay, energy, hop count or else. Query with specified route is encrypted 
/decrypted on the path as it travels from sink to D.  
 
5. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
 
In this section we present a simple and effective validation of our schemes using theorems.  
 
Theorem 1: ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#(ݑ)	of node u must be a prefix of	ܰ∗(ݑ). 
Proof: we proof this theorem by contradiction. Let	ݒ௞, ݒ௞ାଵ are two nodes such that node ݒ௞ାଵis 
in ܮ# = ܮ ∪ {ݒ௞ାଵ} and ݒ௞is not. Let ܧܣܭ௨(ܮ#)is expected key value after and ܧܣܭ௨(ܮ)is 
expected key values before considering	ݒ௞ାଵ. Let ∆௞ାଵ represent the increment achieved, i.e. 
ܧܣܭ௨(ܮ#) = 	 ܧܣܭ௨(ܮ) + ∆௞ାଵ. Had it been ݒ௞ାଵ then	ܮ^ = 	ܮ ∪ {ݒ௞}. In ܰ#(ݑ) , ݒ௞ comes 
earlier than ݒ௞ାଵas ܰ#(ݑ)is sorted on effective key averages. This implies	∆௞≥ ∆௞ାଵ 
andܧܣܭ௨(ܮ^) ≥ ܧܣܭ௨(ܮ#) . Thus selection of ݒ௞ାଵ ahead of ݒ௞ contradicts our selection 
criterion. Hence ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#(ݑ) is prefix of	ܰ#(ݑ).  
  
We further study the properties of forwarder list by introducing another three theorems. The first 
theorem, Theorem 2, shows that if a node, whose expected cost is less than the expected cost of a 
prefix forwarder list, is added to the forwarder list, then the expected cost of the newly created 
forwarder list will decrease while it will still be greater than the expected cost of the newly added 
node. The second theorem, Theorem 3, shows that if a node, whose expected cost is greater than 
the expected cost of a prefix forwarder list, is added to the forwarder list, then the expected cost 
of the newly created forwarder list will increase. Theorem 4 establishes connectivity issues. 
 
Theorem 2: Consider a node	ݑ, a prefix	ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ# and a node ݒ௞ ∈ ܰ(ݑ)/ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#. if	ܧܣܭ௩ೖ >
ܧܣܭ௨(ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#) then	ܧܣܭ௨(ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ# ∪ {ݒ௞}) > ܧܣܭ௨(ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#) and  
ܧܣܭ௨(ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ#) is monotonically non-decreasing. 
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Proof: We can prove above theorem by induction. Let us assume that node to be considered first 
from	ܰ#(ݑ), is ݒଵ	and	ܮ# = ܮ ∪ {ݒଵ}. Let us assume that	|ܮ| = 0 and	ܧܣܭ௨(ܮ) = 0. Using 
equation (5.1) ܧܣܭ௨(ܮ#) = 	 ܧܣܭ௨(ܮ) + ∆ where ∆= (1 − ݂) ∗ ܧܣܭ௩భቀܮ#(ݒ௞ାଵ)ቁ and	݂ 
represents non-negative error probability. This implies	ܧܣܭ௨(ܮ#) ≥	ܧܣܭ௨(ܮ). 
 
Induction step: Considering ݒ௞ next from	ܰ#(ݑ), is ݒ௞ 	and	ܮ# = ܮ ∪ {ݒ௞}. Let us assume 
that	|ܮ| = ݇ − 1 and ܧܣܭ௨(ܮ) is expected key average earned. ܧܣܭ௨(ܮ#) = 	 ܧܣܭ௨(ܮ) + ∆ 
Where ∆= ݂ ∗ ݂ ∗ … (݇ − 1	ݐ݁ݎ݉ݏ) ∗ (1 − ݂) ∗ ܧܣܭ௩ೖቀܮ#(ݒ௞)ቁ  and ݂ represents non-
negative error probability. This implies	ܧܣܭ௨(ܮ#) ≥	ܧܣܭ௨(ܮ). Hence, adding next node 
increments  ܧܣܭ in case ݒ௞ qualifies feasibility criterion of being a member in ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ# . 
 
Considering next from	ܰ#(ݑ), is ݒ௞ାଵ	provided ܧܣܭ௩ೖశభ ≥ ܧܣܭ௨ andܮ# = ܮ ∪ {ݒ௞ାଵ}. Let 
us assume that	|ܮ| = ݇ and ܧܣܭ௨(ܮ) is expected key average earned. ܧܣܭ௨(ܮ#) =
	ܧܣܭ௨(ܮ) + ∆ where ∆= ݂ ∗ ݂ ∗ … (݇	ݐ݁ݎ݉ݏ) ∗ (1− ݂) ∗ ܧܣܭ௩ೖశభቀܮ#(ݒ௞ାଵ)ቁ  and 
݁represents non-negative error probability. This implies	ܧܣܭ௨(ܮ#) ≥	ܧܣܭ௨(ܮ). Hence, adding 
next node increments  ܧܣܭ in any case.  
 
Theorem 3: Querying any node ݑ ∈ ܸ will reach concerned ݑ in O (n) time. 
Proof: As Sink has information about relays and selectors in the network. Sink computes all 
possible paths towards	ݑ. Sink unicast the query consisting of route to ݑ to node at one-hop. One 
hop nodes sends query to one of his selectors mentioned in the path. During query forwarding 
process relay nodes (selectively) forwards query to selector mentioned in the path of query. Query 
follows specified path in the network, and reaches ݑ in limited number of hops. As in the worst 
case path length is	(ܰ − 1). Reply node becomes new source of reply and will route reply on 
encrypted paths through its Data-Relays. 
 
Theorem 4:  All Nodes (∀ݑ ∈ ܸ) in the network are reachable. 
Proof: Let we prove theorem by contradiction. Let there be a node ݑ which is unreachable as 
there is no route to ݑ at sink. This implies ݑ is not selector of any node. It impliesܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ(ݑ) =
∅. With no doubt we can be concluded that	ܰ(ݑ) = ∅. This suggests a partitioned network. 
Otherwise; in a connected network	∀ݑ ∈ ܸ, ܰ(ݑ) ≠ ∅ and equation (5) ensures that only 
neighbour will be in	ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ(ݑ). Thus, in a connected network we have	ܰܪܮ݅ݏݐ(ݑ) ≠ ∅.  As a 
fact sink will have route(s) to	∀ݑ ∈ ܸ. 
   
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
We have proposed a new kind of multi path secure routing which distinguishes relays for query 
and reply, classified as Data-Relays (DRs) and Query-Relays (QRs). With provision of multiple 
DRs and QRs we have reduced the number of trials for successful traversal of packets from 
source to sink. The optimal selection of DRs in the network has been proposed, with objective of 
maximizing the Effective Average Keys on the routes from random node to sink. As the route 
was specified by sink and Forwarders are selected by nodes on the path, any masquerading and 
modification attack rendered ineffective. The analytical modelling supported the objectives and 
supports the strength of proposal. An implementation of the scheme is our next assignment. The 
scheme may be specialized for study of different parameters in demanding environments. 
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